Summary

Repugnant Conclusion (Parfit) exposes population ethics flaw. Classical util: World with 10B barely-worthwhile lives > 1B excellent lives (if total happiness greater). Repugnant because sacrifices quality for quantity. Root problem: Assumes global moral vantage exists to evaluate whole worlds. “World A > World B” presupposes agent living across both, experiencing both. No such agent exists. In subjectivist framework: All value vantage-relative. No “good overall”—only “better from standpoint of X.” Evaluating new existence: Only makes sense relative to valuer (would-be parent, existing society, would-be person if born). Can’t say “total outcome better” in absolute sense—no total agent whose preferences you’re maximizing. All population ethics paradoxes (totalism, averageism, person-affecting views, non-existence asymmetries) stem from this error: treating morality like it operates on global facts vs agent-relative evaluations. Dropping assumption shifts debate: Don’t need to say 1B lives > 10B lives. Only ask: who cares, what do they value? Context-dependent preferences (quantity sometimes, quality others). Conclusion: Population ethics done honestly = decision theory for agents with long-term, population-level preferences. No single answer to “which world better?” Once you realize this, Repugnant Conclusion evaporates. Can’t optimize for everyone—there is no such thing. Only agents, perspectives, values, each navigating own branch of multiverse.

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Notes

  • Applies subjectivist framework to population ethics
  • Dissolves Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion
  • Connects to QBU (multiverse/vantage concepts)